Neutrality and Many-Valued Logics
|Publisher:||American Research Press|
In this book, we consider various many-valued logics: standard, linear, hyperbolic, parabolic, non-Archimedean, p-adic, interval, neutrosophic, etc. We survey also results which show the tree different proof-theoretic frameworks for many-valued logics, e.g. frameworks of the following deductive calculi: Hilbert’s style, sequent, and hypersequent. Recall that hypersequents are a natural generalization of Gentzen’s style sequents that was introduced independently by Avron and Pottinger. In particular, we examine Hilbert’s style, sequent, and hypersequent calculi for infinite-valued logics based on the three fundamental continuous t-norms: Lukasiewicz’s, Godel’s, and Product logics.
We present a general way that allows to construct systematically analytic calculi for a large family of non-Archimedean many-valued logics: hyperrationalvalued, hyperreal-valued, and p-adic valued logics characterized by a special format of semantics with an appropriate rejection of Archimedes’ axiom. These logics are built as different extensions of standard many-valued logics (namely, Lukasiewicz’s, Godel’s, Product, and Post’s logics).
The informal sense of Archimedes’ axiom is that anything can be measured by a ruler. Also logical multiple-validity without Archimedes’ axiom consists in that the set of truth values is infinite and it is not well-founded and well-ordered.